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#221 AllseeingEye

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Posted 20 June 2017 - 09:13 AM

Although the details have yet to fully emerge naturally, and all the pieces sorted into a coherent picture. something nevertheless seems off about this incident. Although anything is possible, including a deliberate act to cripple the destroyer, per this article from The Atlantic the most likely cause(s) appear to point to "professional negligence" on behalf potentially of both ships' officers and/or bridge crews:

 

https://www.theatlan...llision/530793/

 

Moreover the full picture may never emerge if, as suggested here, the USN decides to declare the destroyer's radar and communications records 'classified'.



#222 jonny

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Posted 20 June 2017 - 10:24 AM

Helmsman? What a quaint 20th century notion. I think you meant, helmsbot. ;)

 

Believe it or not, somebody on the bridge is still in charge of steering, even if the ship is on autopilot. Quartermasters still exist. They still have human beings keeping watch, as well, who operate the AIS, monitor visual and radar targets, etc.

 

Things like this only happen after a series of moderate to major screw ups.



#223 Bingo

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Posted 20 June 2017 - 11:10 AM

USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), named for United States Navy officer Lieutenant William Charles Fitzgerald, is an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in the US Navy.

USS Cole (DDG-67) is an Arleigh Burke-class Aegis-equipped guided missile destroyer homeported in Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia.

 

Both ships are of the same class and were launched in the mid 90's.

 

On 12 October 2000, while at anchor in AdenCole was attacked by Al-Qaeda suicide bombers, who sailed a small boat near the destroyer and detonated explosive charges.

The blast created a hole in the port side of the ship about 40 feet (12 m) in diameter, killing 17 crewmembers and injuring 39.

https://en.wikipedia...S_Cole_(DDG-67)

 

 

 

 



#224 jonny

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Posted 20 June 2017 - 12:33 PM

From the pictures I have seen, the Fitzgerald looks like it might be beyond economical repair.



#225 AllseeingEye

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Posted 20 June 2017 - 01:18 PM

Believe it or not, somebody on the bridge is still in charge of steering, even if the ship is on autopilot. Quartermasters still exist. They still have human beings keeping watch, as well, who operate the AIS, monitor visual and radar targets, etc.

 

Things like this only happen after a series of moderate to major screw ups.

Well and here you go, direct from the horse's mouth. In the USN on a "typical" warship there are 6-10 CIC folks, in addition to the bridge crew under the command of the OOD reporting directly to the ship's commander. And that is exclusive of the fore/aft/bridge lookouts physically scanning the surrounding sea....

 

Given all the human and electronic means that should be monitoring the destroyer's position at any given time it is difficult to conceive how this incident even happens. Even assuming a skeleton crew on the freighter (by comparion to the far larger crew and more stringent seamanship practices on the destroyer) and even if it did perform an "unexpected" last minute U-turn, how the ships even got close enough to collide in the first place is hard to envision -

 

http://www.cnn.com/2...ecommended_pool



#226 VicHockeyFan

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Posted 20 June 2017 - 01:26 PM

Ya, even if the freighter swerved in, it should have set off alarms on the warship, and you are right, it should have not been close enough to begin with.  I suspect multiple errors on both ships.


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#227 jonny

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Posted 20 June 2017 - 02:14 PM

Large ships I have been on have the following working on the bridge at a minimum:

- One commanding officer who is in charge of navigation (Master, First Officer, Second Officer, etc.)

- One Quartermaster who is steering / monitoring course/heading

- One Quartermaster as lookout

 

Closed loop communication is standard in a maritime environment as well. (i.e. lookout tells CO "Container ship 2km off our starboard bow". CO repeats the message back as affirmation.)

 

A fancy US Navy boat would have multiple radars, multiple AIS systems and multiple GPS systems. How things like this tragic accident is a growing field of study commonly referred to as Human Factors.

 

For example. Billy the lookout assumed the CO knew there was a cargo ship off their starboard bow and that the person steering the boat had been told how to properly react by the CO. By the time the communication breakdowns became apparent, it was too late.

 

Note that container ships and modern navy ships are quite fast. Most container ships can move 25 knots over ground. The USS Fitzgerald was apparently capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots. Those are fast speeds by maritime standards, and much faster than our local ferries, as a comparison.



#228 jonny

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Posted 20 June 2017 - 02:16 PM

Ya, even if the freighter swerved in, it should have set off alarms on the warship, and you are right, it should have not been close enough to begin with.  I suspect multiple errors on both ships.

 

Multiple errors, without a doubt. Radar and AIS systems are alarmed. They even tell you how many minutes/seconds you are away from collision.



#229 Bingo

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Posted 20 June 2017 - 02:44 PM

 Most container ships can move 25 knots over ground. The USS Fitzgerald was apparently capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots.

 

The damage to the destroyer was on the starboard (right) side of the ship, and the damage to the container ship was on the port (left) side.

The tracking only shows that of the freighter travelling at 17 knots or 20 miles per hour

see photos of damage and course diagram.

https://www.nytimes....fitzgerald.html



#230 HB

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Posted 28 June 2017 - 08:11 PM

BTO is in South Korea for a concert July 1st onboard HMCS Winnipeg



#231 Bingo

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Posted 29 May 2018 - 11:04 AM

She has a new home...

The Royal Canadian Navy’s longest-serving commissioned vessel — a sailing ketch that was launched about 100 years ago — officially has a new home port.

HMCS Oriole, a 31-metre tall ship, will be welcomed today to the Atlantic Fleet in Halifax after more than 60 years at CFB Esquimalt.

The navy says it is being transferred “to enable an entirely different segment of the Canadian population to enjoy the history and heritage” of the tall ship.

The ketch, which underwent maintenance in Nova Scotia, will also be sent off today for deployment to the Great Lakes region.

http://www.timescolo...ifax-1.23316890

 



#232 VANRIDERFAN

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Posted 01 June 2018 - 07:00 AM

I just read the above thread on the Fitz and McCain collisions.

 

I will attempt to clear things up regarding how Naval ships are manoeuvred at night without the Commanding Officer on the bridge. Every nation's navy have their idiosyncrasies on how their bridge watch and CIC report contacts (other ships and aircraft in the vicinity) to the Commanding Officer but the basics are all the same. 

 

So I will describe how the watch is set up on a Royal Canadian Navy Warship and I'll do a little blurb at the end of my experience being part of the watch on a USN frigate.

 

In the RCN: From the first moment we accept the Queen's Commission as an officer in the RCN, these 3 concepts are hammered into us daily;

 

Command, Charge and Control

 

COMMAND:

Command is the authority vested in the CO for the direction, coordination and control of the ship and her company. The Captain retains this authority at all times.

 

CHARGE:

Charge is the responsibility vested in the Commanding Officer for the safe and proper movements and operation of the ship and her company.

 

CONTROL:

Control generally is the authority vested in the CO to give orders pertaining to the operations of the ship. Typical naval operations are sufficiently complex and continuous that the CO may be required to delegate certain aspects of Control. Control may have one of three specific and separate meanings; control of the ship's movements, control of fighting equipment and sensors, and control of tactical employment.

 

As the definitions state, Command, Charge and Control all belong to the Captain. Command is retained by the Captain except under very specific and usually extreme circumstances (death or disablement). Charge is normally delegated by the Captain to the OOW. Unless there is some specific reason to do so, Control is normally retained by the CO. Any one of the three elements of Control can, however, be delegated to any officer deemed competent by the CO.

 

So the officer of the watch (OOW) is given CHARGE when they take the watch. The watch turnover is rather formalized and once the oncoming OOW is satisfied with the information given to them by the off-going OOW, they will announce "I HAVE CHARGE OF THE WATCH". That makes it crystal clear to everyone on the bridge the person who is in charge.

 

On the bridge of a HMCShip there will be a OOW, maybe a 2OOW, a helmsman/throttlesman, 1 or 2 Lookouts (port and stbd) and a Bosn's Mate whose job it is to take phone calls and make pipes (announcements) as required by the ship's routine (schedule) or as ordered by the OOW.

 

To assist the OOW in keeping the ship safe there will be a couple of navigation radars equipped with ARPA (automated reporting and positioning application) and the Electronic Chart Precise Integrated Navigation System (ECPINS) which aggregates all the input data (radar, charts, GPS, and AIS) into one display on the bridge.

These systems will allow the OOW to "hook" (select contacts) and track their progress in relation to their own ship and make sure the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) of the closest contact remains at a safe distance. The lookouts job is to report contacts and assist the OOW in maintaining the visual situational awareness. The OOW's most important sensor is their own eyes. If you get that feeling in your gut that something doesn't seem right usually it isn't and the OOW has to have the wherewithal to take the correct action.

 

Another organization that assists the OOW is the Operations Room which contains all the equipment and people to fight the ship. They have control of the weapons and the long range sensors that can assist the OOW in maintaining the "picture". There is a person who is called the "Track Supervisor" who also hooks contacts, tracks them and reports them up to the OOW. The OOW will use this resource to confirm the tracking of contacts that they have hooked or hold visually.

 

At night or in reduced visibility (fog and other crappy atmospherics) this team has to work together to maintain the safety and security of the ship. This is also the chance for the CO to get some rest and they have to have the confidence in their OOW that they will do their job and call them if a contact's CPA is within their control order (more on that later) with a recommendation to take the appropriate action to avoid a close quarters situation. If the CO does not have that confidence they will not get a restful sleep.

 

CONTROL ORDERS   

Prior to retiring for the evening the CO will write their expectations for the evening in their Night Orders Book that among other things will tell the OOW the control order for the night. Usual control orders have the OOW call the CO if a contact is going to close the ship closer than 2 nautical miles (2,000 yards).

The following comes from CFCD 131 - BWK Manual for the Royal Canadian Navy (2017) Chapter 14 – General Duties of the OOW

 

OOW Contact Report to Captain

The OOW contact report is formal and follows a logical structure. The order in which the information is received is important for the Captain to create a mental picture of the situation. The contact report must include, in order:

a. The type of contact (visual/radar);

b. The relative bearing including a direction (Red/Green) and an angle from the ship’s head, in increments of 5 up to 180;

c. The contact’s range (in yards, cables, or nm);

d. A description of the vessel, with particular reference to its degree of responsibility as defined in ColRegs (PDV, sailing, engaged in fishing, etc) and its name if available;

e. The angle on the bow including the amount of degrees and the direction from her bow (Port / Stbd Bow);

f. The relative movement of the other ship (drawing left/right/ closing on a steady bearing);

g. The CPA range (yards, cables, nm);

h. The CPA relative position (Port/Stbd Bow/Beam/Quarter);

i. The time to CPA (minutes, seconds);

j. An assessment of the situation (no risks of collision, crossing, head-on, overtaking, responsibility between vessels);

k. Correlation with the Navigation Picture in a concise descriptive manner;

l. The ship’s responsibility in accordance with ColRegs (give-way, stand-on);

m. Recommended action (stand-on or formulate a specific manoeuvre in accordance with Colregs).

 

 

Example 1: When the Give-Way Vessel

 

OOW: "Captain, Sir/Ma’am, OOW";

Captain: "Captain";

OOW: "One visual contact to report at G30, 3.5 nm. Small power-driven vessel. We are 45 degrees on her Port Bow. She is closing on a steady bearing in 10 minutes. This is a crossing situation, we are the give-way vessel. Recommend coming right 30 degrees course 180 to open CPA to 8 cables. It is safe to do so";

Captain: "Yes please, come right 180".

 

Example 2: When the Give-Way in a Multiple-Contact Scenario

OOW: "Captain Sir/Ma’am, OOW";

Captain: "Captain";

OOW: "Three new visual and radar contacts to report";

Captain: "Go ahead";

OOW: "First contact bears R70 at 1.5 nm, vessel engaged in fishing making way, we are 120 degrees on her Stbd Bow, she is drawing left, CPA 1.2 nm, Port Beam in 8 minutes. Second contact bears G10, 3 nm, BC Ferry Queen of Nanaimo, we are 45 degrees on her Port Bow, she is drawing left, CPA 1 nm, Port Bow in 12 minutes. Third contact bears G30 at 2.5 nm, ORCA 55, we are 30 degrees on her Port Bow, she is drawing right slowly, CPA 1 cable, Stbd Quarter in 7.5 minutes. There is no risk of collision with the first two contacts, and in a crossing situation with the third contact in which we are the give-way vessel. Recommend coming right 40 degrees course 060 to open CPA on the third contact to 9 cables. This will not interfere with passing the other contacts safely and is navigationally safe to do so";

Captain: "Yes please, come right 40 degrees".

 

Many times the CO has had a long day and this time is for them to get a restful sleep but they must get these reports and they must follow the format as laid out in the regulations. They said the same reports as OOW's to their CO's so they will expect the same from their OOW's. Its almost like an ear worm song and the CO can be half asleep as they are receiving the reports but as long as it comes in the proper format, makes sense and the CO has confidence in the OOW giving the report then all is well. The ship and crew are safe. 

 

If any of these responsibilities break down as they did on USS FITZGERALD, then very bad things happen.

 

Difference between USN ships and RCN ships;

 

USN - Officer of the Deck

RCN - Officer of the Watch

 

USN - Combat Information Center

RCN - Operations Room

 

The USN have a Navigation Team of enlisted personnel who take navigational fixes and report to the OOD.

In the RCN and all other Commonwealth Navies, the OOW will do that work or delegate it to the 2OOW.

 

The issue with USS FITZGERALD is that nobody did their job. The OOD never called the Captain (and there were times the destroyer closed to 500 yards of merchant ships), the CIC did nothing to support the OOD. But the OOD and her fellow officers were also let down not only by their team but a whole culture in the USN of less and less training of junior personnel and more focus on operations for the sake of operations. This is the result, damaged ships and dead sailors. 

 

Sadly I see the same path being followed by the RCN with training being cut back more and more. I pray that our current leadership have read the findings of the USN Board of Inquiry and will take the appropriate action to reverse this trend.

 

Sorry for the long post.

 

Cheers!

 

 


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#233 Bingo

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Posted 01 June 2018 - 12:35 PM

Steel will be cut this month on Canada’s two new Protecteur-class joint support ships as Seaspan’s Vancouver Shipyards fills in a construction gap in long-term project to build non-combat federal vessels.

The North Vancouver company will initially build 52 blocks — to will be used for the support ships — under a $66.5-million contract, Seaspan said Thursday. Blocks are prefabricated sections of a ship that are assembled and then attached together.

 

In 2011, Seaspan won the right to negotiate contracts to built the new generation of non-combat vessels for Canada.

The company anticipates building up to 17 vessels. Ships are being 90 per cent completed in Vancouver. After being launched, they are being brought to Victoria for final work, trials and testing. Seaspan owns Victoria Shipyards, based in Esquimalt.

The first to arrive was the Sir John Franklin, one of three offshore fisheries science vessels being built.

http://digital.times...per/viewer.aspx


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